Is race a natural kind?
Natural kind forms a scientific discipline that is frequently divided to derive the actual meaning. Majorly, the scientific study offers two perceptive, one that entails the naturalness of a “kind” and the kindhood. The naturalness of a kind tries to establish whether the naturalness of a kind is what makes it natural. On the other hand, the kindhood offers a different understanding in that it entails finding out whether the components that make up a thing is what makes it natural (Porcher 2016, 212). However, in consideration of both studies, the naturalness of an element corresponds to the structure of the natural environment, and not on the human interests and actions. Therefore, it is by logical assumption that science has succeeded in revealing all the natural occurrences whereas the classification and the taxonomies are all by scientific realism. As a result, psychology can easily reverse on the kinds that it holds as natural. Therefore, there is a significant connectedness between the study of natural kinds and realism.
The realistic position on natural kinds
In this regard, realism refers to the view of the existence of entities in natural kinds. On the other hand, naturalism refers to the presence of natural groupings with distinctions among them. Therefore, naturalism has no ontological commitment while realism is an ontologically committed type of view. Notably, the realistic position maintains on the fact that it is not possible to explain the differences between the natural and the non-natural groupings without considering entities in natural kinds. (Franklin-Hall and Laura 2015, 928) Different theories on natural kinds exist and efficiently compete to offer a well-developed concept. Firstly, the cluster of natural kinds is usually developed according to similar objectives and common properties which form a single group. It is challenging to determine a natural kind in realism as opposed to conventional. Therefore, a suitable way to draw an appropriate distinction is through the similarities and the standard features while the later majorly depends on the human interests. Secondly, natural kinds are believed to have essences. According to (Magnus 2015, 7), essence refers to a membership-determining a given property which is not only necessary but also sufficient enough to belong to a specific group. However, the theories fail to agree on the way essential characteristics in a kind. Whereas, the fundamental properties are responsible for other features associated with the type. For instance, having an atomic number 79 makes something a member of a particular group. However, there are other properties regarding color, mass and density.
Phenotypical features are sufficient to pick out a natural kind
Evidently, contemporary philosophers in the field of biology held for the longest time that biological species are insufficient to be regarded as natural kinds. However, organic features, for instance, phenotypical features are sufficient enough to pick out a natural kind (Martínez 2015, 99). As a result, incorporation of biological characteristics in natural kind offers an in-depth understanding of natural kinds. Notably, it provides that natural kind involves the cases of spatiotemporally of which are not accidental and resemble each other to form a whole species. Majorly, the controversy regarding the biological aspect and the natural kind occurs due to lack of documentation of any limitation concerning the point in place and time where the natural kind happened. However, instances of any natural kind could occur anywhere and at any time. Therefore, a biological perspective of the natural kind offers a standardized characterization. It defines the natural sort as a collection of objects or individuals with similar properties non-accidentally clustered together.
Evidently, biological species are also natural kinds. For any organic classification, there is a plurality of traits, phenotypic or genotypic. The attributes play a critical role individually and collectively (Kidwell and Kimberlee, et al. 2015, 29). As a result, their input in such a species is necessary and sufficient. It universally agreed that phenotypic traits are natural kinds. However, one reason that claims it unreasonable is the dimorphism. Notably, in every species, there are abnormal or aberrant members who phenotypic traits are the actual reflection of confined genotypic variations. Indeed, it is evident that biological species are among the natural kinds. Their instances happen to be scattered in space and in time, therefore a typical example in which a collection of cases join together to develop one common reason.
A substitute for what picks out the natural kind
The similarity relations majorly determine the spontaneous nature. The connections, however, have been defined differently based on their branch of science. For instance, the subject will establish the similarity based on the field they operate. Notably, biology is expected to identify the similarities between the organisms found in the genealogical information or common genes. Therefore, apart from phenotypical classification, the similarities can be reduced to an allele (1000 Genomes Project Consortium 2015, 70). In this regard, some organisms will be more genetically similar. This would drop out resemblance as a genetic concept to a more specific notion; determine the similarity in molecules and genes. Evidently, any similarity between the constituents conforms to the idea of the natural kind.
In this regard, nature kind classification based on the allele or the genetic concepts enables appropriate classification. Additionally, it allows getting rid of the many paradigms in the natural kinds which do not count as physical kinds. For instance, the private allele in Native Americans is a pattern in the population genetics natural kind. However, an individual allele offers uniqueness in one of the populations from the entire selection of communities. Therefore, the presence of the Native American society determines the existence of the private allele.
Provide at least one objection to the realist position
The realistic stand has been for the longest time suffered a complaint from the anti-realist. The antirealism holds a contradicting view in stipulating that theories are untrue and the majority ought to be disregarded. Evidently, the realistic position provides that oak is a natural kind, while a table is not. Therefore, whenever the question to determine what makes natural and non-natural nature, then no answer. As a result, it has proven challenging to develop responses to so, vital clues regarding the natural kind. Currently, developing the answers to the simple questions is yet to be achieved. According to Ludwig (2017, 35), he has given up on the term “natural” since so far; there is nothing like natural.
According to antirealist, they consider that realists generalize all classes of natural kinds and capture a general philosophical advantage of natural kinds. Additionally, they attract natural types in such a manner that they avoid metaphysics. Notably, some of the most significant theories, for instance, Newton’s laws have been proved wrong. Additionally, Darwin’s natural selection and relativity by Einstein still need some modification and develop some adaptation to make them appropriate (García del Muro Navarro 2017, 29). Therefore, antirealists strongly believe that theories are merely tools of which people use after being approved to be wrong. According to antirealists, most of what them think to be the cause of the world based on the minds ability to create precise features or offer characteristics on what they perceive.
Why realism about race is better than conventionalism
Notably, there nothing in particular that makes a natural kind natural. However, some philosophers have denied this assumption and insisted that a natural kind is relative to a specific inquiry. Therefore, race lacks any biological contradictions between members of other races (Winther 2014, 215). As a result, it may be untrue to conclude that race is not a natural kind. Realism refers to that position attributed to positive ontological status. So when one is a realist about the race, that means the race is real and contains several physical attributes. On the other hand, conventionalist is not constant. Humans are not genetically grounded, however; they usually form due to social practices. Hence, races are adopted based on some broad genetic dissimilarity among some populations. Moreover, the color creates only an outward manifestation. As a result, the realism stand about race is more convincing unlike conventionalism.
[bookmark: _GoBack]In conclusion, natural kind forms a scientific discipline that is frequently divided to derive the actual meaning. Majorly, the scientific study offers two perceptive, one that entails the naturalness of a “kind” and the kindhood. Notably, the realistic position on natural kinds provides that it is not possible to explain the differences between the natural and the non-natural groupings without considering entities in natural kinds. Therefore, a suitable way to draw an appropriate distinction is through the similarities and the standard features. Moreover, phenotypical features are sufficient enough to pick out a natural kind. As a result, incorporation of biological characteristics in natural kind offers an in-depth understanding of natural kinds. Nature kind classification based on the allele or the genetic concepts enables appropriate classification offer a suitable substitute what picks natural kind. Majorly, anti-realist offers the major objection to realist and consider majority of the theories as untrue. However, when one is a realist about the race, that means the race is real and contains several physical attributes.
1000 Genomes Project Consortium. “A global reference for human genetic variation.” Nature 526.7571 (2015): 68-74.
Franklin-Hall, Laura R. “Natural kinds as categorical bottlenecks.” Philosophical Studies 172.4 (2015): 925-948.
García del Muro Navarro, Juan. “The Evolution of Ecosystems through Genetic Algorithms and Neural Networks.” (2017).24-41
Kidwell, Kimberlee Kae, et al. “Glyphosate-tolerant wheat genotypes.” U.S. Patent No. 8,927,834. 6 Jan. 2015.7-24
Ludwig, David. “” Letting go of’Natural Kind’. Towards a Multidimensional Framework of Non-Arbitrary Classification” Philosophy of Science.” (2017). 34-66
Magnus, P. D. “Taxonomy, ontology, and natural kinds.” Synthese (2015): 1-13.
Martínez, Manolo. “Informationally-connected property clusters, and polymorphism.” Biology & Philosophy 30.1 (2015): 99-117.
Porcher, Jose Eduardo. “Delusion as a folk psychological kind.” Filosofia Unisinos 17.2 (2016): 212.
Winther, Rasmus Grønfeldt. “The Genetic Reification of” Race”?: A Story of Two Mathematical Methods.” Critical Philosophy of Race 2.2 (2014): 204-223.
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