Shelton further stated that we could use an environmental, human right to complement the protection of the biosphere with recognition of the intrinsic values of nature also independent from human needs. Birnie and Boyle claim that the effectiveness of such approach depends on the extent that it successfully lowers the emphasis of the uniqueness of the right of man to the environment and “conforms more closely to the characterization of this relationship as a fiduciary one not devoted solely to...
Shelton further stated that we could use an environmental, human right to complement the protection of the biosphere with recognition of the intrinsic values of nature also independent from human needs. Birnie and Boyle claim that the effectiveness of such approach depends on the extent that it successfully lowers the emphasis of the uniqueness of the right of man to the environment and “conforms more closely to the characterization of this relationship as a fiduciary one not devoted solely to the attainment of immediate human needs.” They perceive the consequences of the issue to be overly structural, and that it requires the integration of human rights claims in a broad sense that takes into account the intrinsic values and the needs of generations to come and the continuous competing interests of states.
The position of Rolston on the issue is the opposite. He accepts having human rights to protect human needs for environmental integrity but also adds the suggestion that human has elaborate responsibility for nature. Nickel opined that the usefulness and justification of human rights are in the protection of human interests and the provision of a connection between the environment and human rights movements the name given to his approach is “accommodationist” – saying that anthropocentrism is not an objection if “it can be supplemented by other norms that will address other issues”. It is possible to perceive it as a useful part of “the normative repertory of environmentalism.”